2026-10
“GitPython: Arbitrary local file content disclosure via [include] directive in untrusted .gitmodules (SubmoduleConfigParser never disables merge_includes)”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: clone_from()/clone() omit --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options, enabling arbitrary git-directory creation outside the destination”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: Environment-variable exfiltration via Repo.create_remote() / Remote.add() URL (incomplete fix of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573)”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: command injection via unguarded Git options in Repo.archive(), git.ls_remote(), and arbitrary file overwrite via Repo.iter_commits() / Repo.blame()”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: Unguarded git option forwarding in Repo.init enables arbitrary command execution via --template clone hooks”osv.dev ›
“GitPython Remote.pull() refspec bypasses the --upload-pack unsafe-option guard, enabling arbitrary command execution”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite via git diff --output argument injection in Diffable.diff (key- and value-controlled)”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: Denial of Service via catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS) in Actor.name_email_regex — commit author/committer field parsing”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: Submodule.move() follows an attacker-committed intermediate symlink outside the worktree”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: Arbitrary file read via --pathspec-from-file in IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout()”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: Arbitrary Git Repository Creation Outside the Working Tree via Unvalidated .gitmodules Submodule Name in GitPython”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: git-config OPTION-name injection via =/#/whitespace bypasses name validator, enabling forged core.sshCommand/hooksPath (RCE)”osv.dev ›
“GitPython parse_actor_and_date() is vulnerable to quadratic backtracking on malformed identity lines”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: Newline injection in config_writer() section parameter bypasses CVE-2026-42215 patch, enabling RCE via core.hooksPath”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: Arbitrary file truncation via git rev-list --output argument injection in unguarded Commit.count”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: Environment-variable exfiltration via os.path.expandvars() on Repo.clone_from() URL”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: Newline injection in config_writer().set_value() enables RCE via core.hooksPath”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via split_single_char_options=False short-option token smuggling enables command execution”osv.dev ›
“GitPython: Unsafe option check validates multi_options before shlex.split transformation”osv.dev ›
“Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA): Specially crafted inputs to idna.encode() can bypass CVE-2024-3651 fix”osv.dev ›
“Jinja vulnerable to HTML attribute injection when passing user input as keys to xmlattr filter”osv.dev ›
“Jinja vulnerable to HTML attribute injection when passing user input as keys to xmlattr filter”osv.dev ›
“Pygments has Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to Inefficient Regex for GUID Matching”osv.dev ›
“python-dotenv: Symlink following in set_key allows arbitrary file overwrite via cross-device rename fallback”osv.dev ›
“python-multipart: Quadratic-time querystring parsing with semicolon separators causes CPU denial of service”osv.dev ›
“python-multipart: Semicolon treated as querystring field separator enables parameter smuggling”osv.dev ›
“python-multipart affected by Denial of Service via large multipart preamble or epilogue data”osv.dev ›
“python-multipart: Negative Content-Length in parse_form buffers the entire body in memory”osv.dev ›
“python-multipart: Content-Disposition parameter smuggling via RFC 2231/5987 extended parameters”osv.dev ›
“Requests has Insecure Temp File Reuse in its extract_zipped_paths() utility function”osv.dev ›
“Starlette has possible denial-of-service vector when parsing large files in multipart forms”osv.dev ›
“Starlette: request.form() limits silently ignored for application/x-www-form-urlencoded enable DoS”osv.dev ›
“Starlette has missing Host header validation that poisons request.url.path, bypassing path-based security checks”osv.dev ›
“Starlette: Unvalidated request path concatenated into authority poisons request.url.hostname”osv.dev ›