Changes

2026-10

• 

  anyio: AnyIO process-pool workers can block indefinitely on undrained stderr

  PyPI · anyio✕security
  Quote

  “AnyIO process-pool workers can block indefinitely on undrained stderr”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  anyio: AnyIO: TLSStream IDNA 2003 host name encoding enables potential TLS certificate spoofing

  PyPI · anyio✕security
  Quote

  “AnyIO: TLSStream IDNA 2003 host name encoding enables potential TLS certificate spoofing”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  certifi: certifi bundles emSign root CAs with compromised intermediate CA keys

  PyPI · certifi✕security
  Quote

  “certifi bundles emSign root CAs with compromised intermediate CA keys”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  cryptography: cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing

  PyPI · cryptography✕security
  Quote

  “cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  dnspython: dnspython dns.name.from_wire_parser() excessive CPU use

  PyPI · dnspython✕security
  Quote

  “dnspython dns.name.from_wire_parser() excessive CPU use”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  filelock: filelock: On Windows an oplock on a soft lock's marker holds SoftFileLock.acquire() past its timeout and blocks the stale break

  PyPI · filelock✕security
  Quote

  “filelock: On Windows an oplock on a soft lock's marker holds SoftFileLock.acquire() past its timeout and blocks the stale break”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  filelock: filelock: StrictSoftFileLock creates its claim directories without the lock mode, so another local user with a write bit on them can end a live hold

  PyPI · filelock✕security
  Quote

  “filelock: StrictSoftFileLock creates its claim directories without the lock mode, so another local user with a write bit on them can end a live hold”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  filelock: filelock: UnixFileLock truncates and chmods any regular file another user renames or hard-links onto the lock path

  PyPI · filelock✕security
  Quote

  “filelock: UnixFileLock truncates and chmods any regular file another user renames or hard-links onto the lock path”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  filelock: filelock: WindowsFileLock ignores mode: a 0o600 lock file and the ReadWriteLock database inherit the directory ACL

  PyPI · filelock✕security
  Quote

  “filelock: WindowsFileLock ignores mode: a 0o600 lock file and the ReadWriteLock database inherit the directory ACL”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  filelock: filelock: StrictSoftFileLock and SoftReadWriteLock adopt a protocol directory another user created first, losing mutual exclusion

  PyPI · filelock✕security
  Quote

  “filelock: StrictSoftFileLock and SoftReadWriteLock adopt a protocol directory another user created first, losing mutual exclusion”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  filelock: filelock: ReadWriteLock on Windows acts on SQLite side files another local user places beside its database

  PyPI · filelock✕security
  Quote

  “filelock: ReadWriteLock on Windows acts on SQLite side files another local user places beside its database”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  filelock: filelock ReadWriteLock: a crafted lock database makes every acquire stall or hang regardless of timeout

  PyPI · filelock✕security
  Quote

  “filelock ReadWriteLock: a crafted lock database makes every acquire stall or hang regardless of timeout”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  filelock: filelock: SoftFileLock stale-lock break removes a live lock file on a reused inode number and admits two holders

  PyPI · filelock✕security
  Quote

  “filelock: SoftFileLock stale-lock break removes a live lock file on a reused inode number and admits two holders”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  filelock: filelock: ReadWriteLock follows a symlink at the lock path into SQLite

  PyPI · filelock✕security
  Quote

  “filelock: ReadWriteLock follows a symlink at the lock path into SQLite”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  filelock: filelock: StrictSoftFileLock follows a symbolic link swapped in at <path>.filelock and creates claim files in a directory another local user chooses

  PyPI · filelock✕security
  Quote

  “filelock: StrictSoftFileLock follows a symbolic link swapped in at <path>.filelock and creates claim files in a directory another local user chooses”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  filelock: filelock Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Symlink Vulnerability in SoftFileLock

  PyPI · filelock✕security
  Quote

  “filelock Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Symlink Vulnerability in SoftFileLock”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  filelock: filelock: SoftFileLock removes a live holder's marker when another user forges the PID in a writable marker

  PyPI · filelock✕security
  Quote

  “filelock: SoftFileLock removes a live holder's marker when another user forges the PID in a writable marker”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  filelock: filelock ReadWriteLock: SQLite reopens the lock database by name, so a planted symlink or journal file makes the lock user's process overwrite or unlink its own files

  PyPI · filelock✕security
  Quote

  “filelock ReadWriteLock: SQLite reopens the lock database by name, so a planted symlink or journal file makes the lock user's process overwrite or unlink its own files”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  filelock: filelock has a TOCTOU race condition which allows symlink attacks during lock file creation

  PyPI · filelock✕security
  Quote

  “filelock has a TOCTOU race condition which allows symlink attacks during lock file creation”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  flask: Flask session does not add `Vary: Cookie` header when accessed in some ways

  PyPI · flask✕security
  Quote

  “Flask session does not add Vary: Cookie header when accessed in some ways”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  flask: Flask vulnerable to possible disclosure of permanent session cookie due to missing Vary: Cookie header

  PyPI · flask✕security
  Quote

  “Flask vulnerable to possible disclosure of permanent session cookie due to missing Vary: Cookie header”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Repository content can impersonate the git directory, leading to arbitrary code execution

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Repository content can impersonate the git directory, leading to arbitrary code execution”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: arbitrary file read via attacker-controlled branch name in `Head.checkout()` (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-78679)

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: arbitrary file read via attacker-controlled branch name in Head.checkout() (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-78679)”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Dormant multi-line git-config values are corrupted into live injected directives (e.g. core.hooksPath) on any unrelated GitConfigParser write, enabling RCE

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Dormant multi-line git-config values are corrupted into live injected directives (e.g. core.hooksPath) on any unrelated GitConfigParser write, enabling RCE”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Command Injection via git long-option prefix abbreviation bypass of CVE-2026-42215 blocklist

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Command Injection via git long-option prefix abbreviation bypass of CVE-2026-42215 blocklist”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Unguarded git option forwarding in IndexFile.checkout() and TagReference.create() enables arbitrary file overwrite and arbitrary file read

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Unguarded git option forwarding in IndexFile.checkout() and TagReference.create() enables arbitrary file overwrite and arbitrary file read”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: git-config section-name injection enables arbitrary config directives (core.sshCommand RCE)

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: git-config section-name injection enables arbitrary config directives (core.sshCommand RCE)”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: TagReference.create positional reference bypasses kwargs-only --file guard, enabling arbitrary file read (incomplete fix of 3af0c251)

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: TagReference.create positional reference bypasses kwargs-only --file guard, enabling arbitrary file read (incomplete fix of 3af0c251)”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree enables arbitrary file overwrite

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree enables arbitrary file overwrite”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_archive_options denylist omits --add-file / --add-virtual-file, enabling arbitrary file read via Repo.archive()

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_archive_options denylist omits --add-file / --add-virtual-file, enabling arbitrary file read via Repo.archive()”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_revision_options denylist omits --contents/-S, enabling arbitrary file read via Repo.blame()

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_revision_options denylist omits --contents/-S, enabling arbitrary file read via Repo.blame()”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits --template enabling arbitrary command execution via clone hooks

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits --template enabling arbitrary command execution via clone hooks”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython reference APIs has a path traversal vulnerability that allows arbitrary file write and delete outside the repository

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython reference APIs has a path traversal vulnerability that allows arbitrary file write and delete outside the repository”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary local file content disclosure via [include] directive in untrusted .gitmodules (SubmoduleConfigParser never disables merge_includes)

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Arbitrary local file content disclosure via [include] directive in untrusted .gitmodules (SubmoduleConfigParser never disables merge_includes)”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython validates a submodule's ".git" path only after cloning into it (RCE)

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython validates a submodule's ".git" path only after cloning into it (RCE)”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: clone_from()/clone() omit --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options, enabling arbitrary git-directory creation outside the destination

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: clone_from()/clone() omit --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options, enabling arbitrary git-directory creation outside the destination”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Environment-variable exfiltration via Repo.create_remote() / Remote.add() URL (incomplete fix of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573)

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Environment-variable exfiltration via Repo.create_remote() / Remote.add() URL (incomplete fix of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573)”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: command injection via unguarded Git options in `Repo.archive()`, `git.ls_remote()`, and arbitrary file overwrite via `Repo.iter_commits()` / `Repo.blame()`

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: command injection via unguarded Git options in Repo.archive(), git.ls_remote(), and arbitrary file overwrite via Repo.iter_commits() / Repo.blame()”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Unguarded git option forwarding in Repo.init enables arbitrary command execution via --template clone hooks

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Unguarded git option forwarding in Repo.init enables arbitrary command execution via --template clone hooks”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython Remote.pull() refspec bypasses the --upload-pack unsafe-option guard, enabling arbitrary command execution

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython Remote.pull() refspec bypasses the --upload-pack unsafe-option guard, enabling arbitrary command execution”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite via git diff --output argument injection in Diffable.diff (key- and value-controlled)

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite via git diff --output argument injection in Diffable.diff (key- and value-controlled)”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Denial of Service via catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS) in Actor.name_email_regex — commit author/committer field parsing

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Denial of Service via catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS) in Actor.name_email_regex — commit author/committer field parsing”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Submodule.move() follows an attacker-committed intermediate symlink outside the worktree

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Submodule.move() follows an attacker-committed intermediate symlink outside the worktree”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary file read via --pathspec-from-file in IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout()

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Arbitrary file read via --pathspec-from-file in IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout()”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary Git Repository Creation Outside the Working Tree via Unvalidated .gitmodules Submodule Name in GitPython

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Arbitrary Git Repository Creation Outside the Working Tree via Unvalidated .gitmodules Submodule Name in GitPython”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: git-config OPTION-name injection via =/#/whitespace bypasses name validator, enabling forged core.sshCommand/hooksPath (RCE)

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: git-config OPTION-name injection via =/#/whitespace bypasses name validator, enabling forged core.sshCommand/hooksPath (RCE)”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython parse_actor_and_date() is vulnerable to quadratic backtracking on malformed identity lines

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython parse_actor_and_date() is vulnerable to quadratic backtracking on malformed identity lines”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Newline injection in config_writer() section parameter bypasses CVE-2026-42215 patch, enabling RCE via core.hooksPath

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Newline injection in config_writer() section parameter bypasses CVE-2026-42215 patch, enabling RCE via core.hooksPath”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary file truncation via git rev-list --output argument injection in unguarded Commit.count

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Arbitrary file truncation via git rev-list --output argument injection in unguarded Commit.count”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython has Command Injection via Git options bypass

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython has Command Injection via Git options bypass”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Environment-variable exfiltration via os.path.expandvars() on Repo.clone_from() URL

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Environment-variable exfiltration via os.path.expandvars() on Repo.clone_from() URL”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Newline injection in config_writer().set_value() enables RCE via core.hooksPath

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Newline injection in config_writer().set_value() enables RCE via core.hooksPath”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython command wrappers omit unsafe protocol and option checks

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython command wrappers omit unsafe protocol and option checks”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via split_single_char_options=False short-option token smuggling enables command execution

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via split_single_char_options=False short-option token smuggling enables command execution”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gitpython: GitPython: Unsafe option check validates multi_options before shlex.split transformation

  PyPI · gitpython✕security
  Quote

  “GitPython: Unsafe option check validates multi_options before shlex.split transformation”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gunicorn: Gunicorn HTTP Request/Response Smuggling vulnerability

  PyPI · gunicorn✕security
  Quote

  “Gunicorn HTTP Request/Response Smuggling vulnerability”

  osv.dev ›
• 

  gunicorn: Request smuggling leading to endpoint restriction bypass in Gunicorn

  PyPI · gunicorn✕security
  Quote

  “Request smuggling leading to endpoint restriction bypass in Gunicorn”

  osv.dev ›