2026-11
“esbuild enables any website to send any requests to the development server and read the response”osv.dev ›
“fast-uri vulnerable to scheme injection via an unescaped first-segment colon in suffix references”osv.dev ›
“fast-uri vulnerable to improper path equivalence in relative reference normalization”osv.dev ›
2026-10
“DOMPurify's ADD_TAGS function form bypasses FORBID_TAGS due to short-circuit evaluation”osv.dev ›
“DOMPurify: IN_PLACE returns a force-removed rawtext root whose text carries attacker markup — pure HTML reparse executes”osv.dev ›
“DOMPurify: Hook mutation of data.allowedTags / data.allowedAttributes permanently pollutes DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS / DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR”osv.dev ›
“DOMPurify: CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING bypasses afterSanitizeElements for allowed custom elements.”osv.dev ›
“DOMPurify: SMIL attributeName=href guard is skipped when PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE is application/xhtml+xml”osv.dev ›
“DOMPurify: Permanent ALLOWED_ATTR pollution via setConfig() bypassing the hook clone-guard (incomplete fix of the 3.4.7 hook-pollution patch)”osv.dev ›
“DOMPurify: SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass - template expressions survive sanitization inside <template> content when using DOM output modes”osv.dev ›
“DOMPurify: FORBID_TAGS bypassed by function-based ADD_TAGS predicate (asymmetry with FORBID_ATTR fix)”osv.dev ›
“DOMPurify: Cross-realm IN_PLACE sanitization leaves executable markup intact via realm-bound instanceof checks”osv.dev ›
“DOMPurify IN_PLACE: hook that removes a parent or sibling leaves the detached subtree's event handlers armed (incomplete fix for GHSA-p98j-92pf-mc4p)”osv.dev ›
“DOMPurify: IN_PLACE mode preserves attributes of a clobbered root element, allowing XSS via attacker-controlled root DOM”osv.dev ›
“DOMPurify IN_PLACE Sanitization Bypass via Attached Shadow Root Inside <template>.content”osv.dev ›
“DOMPurify: Trusted Types policy survives clearConfig() and can poison later RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE output”osv.dev ›
“DOMPurify: IN_PLACE mode trusts attacker-controlled nodeName on live non-form nodes, allowing script retention and XSS via attacker-supplied DOM objects”osv.dev ›
“Elliptic's private key extraction in ECDSA upon signing a malformed input (e.g. a string)”osv.dev ›
“es5-ext vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service in function#copy and function#toStringTokens”osv.dev ›
“fast-uri vulnerable to inconsistent host case normalization via percent-encoded octets”osv.dev ›
“follow-redirects leaks Custom Authentication Headers to Cross-Domain Redirect Targets”osv.dev ›