2026-11
“fast-uri vulnerable to scheme injection via an unescaped first-segment colon in suffix references”osv.dev ›
“fast-uri vulnerable to improper path equivalence in relative reference normalization”osv.dev ›
“form-data: CRLF injection in form-data via unescaped multipart field names and filenames”osv.dev ›
“JS-YAML: Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (3.x and 4.x) — CVE-2026-59870 fix not backported”osv.dev ›
2026-10
“fast-uri vulnerable to inconsistent host case normalization via percent-encoded octets”osv.dev ›
“follow-redirects leaks Custom Authentication Headers to Cross-Domain Redirect Targets”osv.dev ›
“Handlebars.js has Prototype Pollution Leading to XSS through Partial Template Injection”osv.dev ›
“Handlebars.js has JavaScript Injection via AST Type Confusion by tampering @partial-block”osv.dev ›
“Handlebars.js has a Prototype Method Access Control Gap via Missing __lookupSetter__ Blocklist Entry”osv.dev ›
“Handlebars: JavaScript Injection via AST Type Confusion in compile (bypass of CVE-2026-33937)”osv.dev ›
“Handlebars.js has Denial of Service via Malformed Decorator Syntax in Template Compilation”osv.dev ›
“Handlebars.js has JavaScript Injection via AST Type Confusion when passing an object as dynamic partial”osv.dev ›
“Handlebars.js has JavaScript Injection in CLI Precompiler via Unescaped Names and Options”osv.dev ›
“Handlebars: JavaScript Injection via Unsafe Inline Embedding of Precompiled Templates”osv.dev ›
“Immutable: Hash-collision algorithmic complexity denial of service in Immutable.Map/Set”osv.dev ›
“ip-address: misclassification of IPv4-mapped/NAT64 IPv6 addresses can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks”osv.dev ›
“ip-address: no classifier recognizes the NAT64 local-use range 64:ff9b:1::/48, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass”osv.dev ›
“ip-address: a CIDR suffix on the parsed address suppresses special-use classification and can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks”osv.dev ›
“ip-address: Address6 builds a parse diagnostic proportional to the input with no length bound, allowing a single long string to stall or crash the process”osv.dev ›
“ip-address: isInSubnet() and isHostInSubnet() compare addresses of different families as if they shared an address space, allowing an allowlist check to admit an address outside its range”osv.dev ›
“ip-address: Address4 decodes leading-zero octets as decimal while resolvers decode them as octal, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass”osv.dev ›
“ip-address: Address6.isLinkLocal() recognizes fe80::/64 rather than fe80::/10, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass to on-link hosts”osv.dev ›
“ip-address: Address6 matches a zone identifier in quadratic time ahead of its length limit, allowing a single long string to stall the process”osv.dev ›